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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No. 920126 
v. : 
M. ELDON BARNES, i Priority No. 3 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from an order denying a petition for 
post-conviction relief in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable David S. Young, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the prosecution's failure to notify petitioner 
before taking sworn statements of two witnesses violate 
petitioner's constitutional rights to due process, to the 
assistance of counsel, and to confront and cross-examine the 
witnesses? In reviewing a denial of habeas corpus relief, this 
Court will uphold the trial court's factual findings unless 
"clearly erroneous," but will review the lower court's legal 
conclusions for correctness. Termunde v. Utah State Prison, 786 
P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990). 
2. Was petitioner denied effective assistance of trial 
counsel due to the cumulative effect of counsel's allegedly 
substandard conduct? An ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
in a habeas proceeding presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
2070 (1984). The factual findings are reviewed for clear error, 
and the questions of law are reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
3. Is petitioner constitutionally entitled to payment 
by the State of the costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
pursuing his first state habeas petition and the initial appeal 
therefrom? Although petitioner seeks a ruling on this issue as a 
matter of constitutional law, the district court found that the 
claim presented a legislative question, not a judicial one. 
Constitutional and statutory interpretation claims present 
questions of law which this Court reviews for correctness. City 
of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert. 
denied. 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990); State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 
P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 
P.2d 455, 457 (Utah 1989) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
All pertinent constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions 
are included in the separately-bound addenda submitted herewith. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Upon a plea of guilty entered on September IB, 1987, 
petitioner Joseph Mitchell Parsons was convicted of murder in the 
first degree, a capital felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-202 (1978); of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
2 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978); and of theft of an 
operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) (Fifth Dist. Record [hereinafter 
M5th R."] at 79-86, 87; Fifth Dist. Arraignment Transcript at 9). 
Sentencing proceedings were conducted January 26 through 29, 
1988, in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah (5th R. at 146-155). A sentencing jury 
unanimously imposed the death penalty (5th R. at 297-99). 
Petitioner, through appointed trial counsel, appealed 
to the Utah Supreme Court (5th R. at 403-04). The Court affirmed 
petitioner's convictions and sentence in State v. Parsons, 781 
P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) (a copy of the opinion is submitted 
herewith as Addendum A). Petitioner filed a petition for 
rehearing in the Utah Supreme Court on December 4, 1989 (5th R. 
unnumbered, letter dated Dec. 19, 1989). The Court denied the 
petition on January 22, 1990 (5th R. unnumbered, Remittitur dated 
Jan. 22, 1990). 
Petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus 
relief in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on March 8, 1990 (Third Dist. R. [hereinafter "3d 
R."] at 2-5). The court appointed counsel for petitioner, and 
counsel filed an amended petition on October 22, 1990, which 
challenged the legality and constitutionality of petitioner's 
sentence under the federal and state constitutions based on an 
allegation of ineffective assistance of defense counsel at trial 
(3d R. at 14, 17-23). An evidentiary hearing was held on May 24, 
3 
1991 (3d R. at 214). Thereafter, the court denied the petition 
(3d R. at 249-67). Petitioner appeals from the district court's 
ruling, asking this Court to vacate his sentence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Late on August 30, 1987, Richard L. Ernest saw 
petitioner hitchhiking near Barstow, California, and stopped to 
offer him a ride (Sent. Tr. II at 666, 680-83; Sent. Tr. IV at 
1035, 1038-39, 1080-81 ).* At that time, petitioner was on 
parole from a Nevada prison after a conviction of armed robbery 
(Sent. Tr. Ill at 900-01, 915-17; Sent. Tr. IV at 1015-17, 1028). 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 31, 1987, Ernest 
pulled into a rest area near Cedar City, Utah, and both men 
settled in to sleep (Sent. Tr. IV at 1040-41, 1094-97, 1102, 
1116). Petitioner claimed at the penalty hearing that Ernest 
made two sexual advances (Sent. Tr. IV at 1041-42, 1099, 1101-
02). When petitioner attempted to exit the car after the second 
advance, Ernest tried to stop him, and, in the ensuing struggle, 
petitioner stabbed Ernest several times (Sent. Tr. Ill at 862, 
868; Sent. Tr. IV at 1042-44, 1101-03, 1106-08). 
Petitioner pushed Ernest's body out of the car a mile 
down the road, then drove five miles further to a convenience 
store where he cleaned up and assumed Ernest's identity to 
purchase food and gas (Sent. Tr. II at 548, 712, 717-19, 722-26; 
Sent. Tr. IV at 1045-50, 1111, 1113-16, 1122, 1127). Later that 
1
 The penalty phase transcript is comprised of multiple 
volumes. Citations thereto in this brief will be: Sent. Tr. 
[vol.] at [page]. 
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morning, he again used Ernest's money and credit cards to obtain 
lodging and to purchase several items (Sent. Tr. II at 739-42, 
748-54, 757-62; Sent. Tr. Ill at 775-77, 780-82; Sent. Tr. IV at 
1051-53, 1128-30, 1136-41). 
Police officers were alerted to the credit card 
purchases and petitioner's unusual activities (Sent. Tr. II at 
569-70, 583-84, 597-98). At 4:15 p.m. on August 31, the police 
found petitioner in Ernest's car at a rest area and arrested him 
(Sent. Tr. II at 598; Sent. Tr. Ill at 789-91; Sent. Tr. IV at 
1055, 1142-43). At 10:50 a.m. on September 1, the police 
discovered Ernest's body (Sent. Tr. II at 548, 588-89). 
The court appointed James Shumate to represent 
petitioner (5th R. at 69-71).2 A preliminary hearing began on 
September 17, 1987, but, at petitioner's request, was not 
completed (5th R. at 4-22, 76-77). On September 18, petitioner 
entered a plea of guilty to all three counts (5th R. at 87). He 
elected to be sentenced by a jury, and the jury imposed the death 
penalty following the penalty hearing (5th R. at 299). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I: This Court should not consider the merits of 
the first issue because petitioner did not timely raise it in his 
direct appeal, although he should and could have done so. He 
offers no "unusual circumstances" to justify his failure. 
Should this Court reach the merits of petitioner's 
claim, it should conduct only a federal constitutional analysis. 
2
 Mr. Shumate is now a Fifth District Court Judge. 
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Petitioner presents no separate state analysis in his brief and 
made only nominal reference to the state constitution in the 
district court during the habeas proceedings. 
Under a federal constitutional analysis, the two 
statements are not depositions but are sworn investigative 
statements. They were part of the State's early pre-trial 
investigation and were used only by petitioner at trial. There 
is no evidence that the State attempted to "create" testimony by 
taking the statements under oath, and petitioner's claim that the 
statements prejudicially "locked in" testimony is purely 
speculative. He establishes no denial of a constitutional right. 
Finally, petitioner has abandoned his claim that his 
trial counsel's failure to attack the statements constitutes 
ineffective assistance where he does not present the argument to 
this Court, and he withdrew the argument at the district court 
level to pursue the issue as a substantive error. 
Point II: All of the alleged deficiencies in the 
conduct of petitioner's trial counsel constitute reasonable trial 
strategy or otherwise fall within the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance. Further, petitioner fails 
to establish the requisite prejudice for any of his claims. As 
none of the claimed errors are either substantial or prejudicial, 
the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. 
Point III: The federal constitution does not require 
the state to provide counsel to indigent inmates at state expense 
for pursuit of postconviction review. Petitioner provides no 
6 
valid basis for his suggested expansion of state constitutional 
rights beyond those recognized at the federal level. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER'S SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGE TO THE 
SWORN STATEMENTS IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED, AS 
IT SHOULD AND COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON 
DIRECT APPEAL; ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT 
COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE STATEMENTS 
WERE MERELY INVESTIGATIVE, AND PETITIONER'S 
SPECULATIVE ARGUMENTS DO NOT ESTABLISH ANY 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
A. Procedural Bar 
Petitioner claims that the prosecution's failure to 
provide him with notice of and an opportunity to appear at the 
taking of the two sworn statements denied him his due process 
rights, his right to counsel, and his right to confront witnesses 
under the federal and state constitutions (Br. of App. at 11-12). 
His failure to raise this issue in his direct appeal and his 
untimely presentation of this issue in his habeas proceedings 
procedurally bar review of the merits. 
Generally, habeas corpus proceedings are used to attack 
a conviction when an obvious injustice or a substantial denial of 
a constitutional right occurred at trial. Gerrish v. Barnes, No. 
900352, slip op. at 8 (Utah Dec. 16, 1992); Fernandez v. Cook, 
783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989); Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 804 
(Utah 1988). A petitioner cannot raise issues in his habeas 
petition that could or should have been raised on direct appeal 
absent unusual circumstances justifying the failure to raise the 
issues earlier. Gerrish, slip op. at 8; Jensen v. DeLand, 795 
7 
P.2d 619, 620 (Utah 1989); Fernandez, 783 P.2d at 549; see Bundy, 
763 P.2d at 804; Wells v. Shulsen. 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 
1983). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel come within 
this "unusual circumstances" exception when the same counsel 
represented the petitioner at trial and on direct appeal.3 
Fernandez, 783 P.2d at 549; see Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 
1035-36 & n.6 (Utah 1989) (collecting cases on "unusual 
circumstances" and indicating that such circumstances exist where 
a petitioner is unjustifiably denied an opportunity to raise an 
issue on direct appeal). In this case, petitioner's claim of a 
substantive constitutional violation is asserted independent of 
his ineffectiveness argument; therefore petitioner must establish 
unusual circumstances justifying his failure to raise the 
substantive violation on direct appeal. 
Petitioner relies on his trial memorandum from the 
habeas proceedings as adequately raising the issue (Br. of App. 
at 12), and makes no reference to or justification for his 
failure to include the point in his direct appeal. His habeas 
petition was based on several alleged instances of ineffective 
assistance which encompassed the sworn statements (3d R. at 17-
23; copy submitted herewith as Addendum B). It was not until the 
3
 The fact that trial counsel also represented a defendant on 
direct appeal constitutes an unusual circumstance only in the 
context of a claim of ineffective assistance because counsel cannot 
be expected to raise his own ineffectiveness. Fernandez, 783 P.2d 
at 549-50. This concern does not apply in areas of substantive 
error. See id., 783 P.2d at 550. 
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day before the evidentiary hearing that petitioner filed the 
trial memorandum which, for the first time, asserted that the 
taking of the statements constituted a substantive due process 
violation warranting reversal of his conviction (3d R. at 188-
213; copy submitted herewith as Addendum C). When asked to 
procedurally bar the issue, the district court refused, saying 
that "when the focus of the petitioner's claim[, as] stated 
herein, is on the effectiveness of counsel, and since that same 
counsel handled both the trial and appeal, it seems appropriate 
and equitable that this Court consider those arguments on their 
merits." (3d R. at 256; copy submitted herewith as Addendum D). 
The court then addressed the issue in the manner in which it was 
first presented: part of the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel (3d R. at 253-55, 257-65; Addendum D). 
The district court erred in refusing to procedurally 
bar this issue. See Pierre v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1282, 1283 (10th 
Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1033 (1987). This Court must 
correct that error to achieve consistent application of Utah's 
procedural bar rules. Where state courts fail to consistently 
apply the state procedural bar rules, federal courts are not 
bound by those rules in federal postconviction review and may 
reach the merits of issues otherwise not properly before them. 
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-61, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1043 
(1989) (generally, federal courts are not prevented from reaching 
the merits of a claim on habeas unless the last state court 
rendering a judgment "clearly and expressly" states that its 
9 
decision rests on a state procedural bar); Andrews v. Deland, 943 
F.2d 1162, 1188-92 (1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1213 (1992); 
Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1506-08 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Because the substantive issue petitioner now seeks to 
have reviewed was not raised in his direct appeal, despite its 
availability, and petitioner advances no justification for his 
failure to timely raise the issue, there are no "unusual 
circumstances" and the issue should be procedurally barred. 
B. Merits 
1. State Constitutional Review 
Petitioner asserts that this Court should find a per se 
violation of his rights under both the state and federal 
constitutions (Br. of App. at 17). However, he made only nominal 
reference to the state constitution in his trial memorandum to 
the district court during his habeas review (see Addendum C), and 
he has provided no separate analysis in his brief to this Court 
based on state constitutional provisions. Consequently, a 
separate state constitutional analysis is not warranted. State 
v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 & n.5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus 
granted on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10 Cir. 1991). 
2. Federal Constitutional Review 
Petitioner characterizes the two sworn statements he 
now challenges as "depositions" and contends that the taking of 
depositions without notice to or the presence of petitioner or 
his counsel constitutes a per se violation of his due process 
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right, his right to counsel, and his right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against him. 
The district court found that "these 'depositions' were 
nothing more than investigative sworn statements, and in fact 
worked to the benefit of the petitioner during the course of the 
penalty phase of the trial. . . . The statements were from the 
beginning readily available to defense counsel, and were only 
generated in order to preserve investigative information." (3d R. 
at 260-61; 276-77; Addendum D). The court thus concluded "that 
the statements were not 'depositions', but were rather 'sworn 
statements' generated by a careful and thoughtful investigative 
prosecutor." (3d R. at 261; Addendum D). Petitioner challenges 
the latter finding. This Court will uphold the trial court's 
factual findings unless it finds them to be "clearly erroneous." 
Termunde v. Utah State Prison, 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990). 
A. Characterization of Statements 
As petitioner recognizes, the timing and nature of the 
statements are important. This case, characterized by the 
prosecutor as a major case (Evidentiary Hearing Transcript 
[hereinafter "H.C. Tr."] at 352), involved a murder occurring in 
the early morning hours of August 31, 1987. Petitioner was 
apprehended later the same day (Sent. Tr. Ill at 789-91). The 
victim's body was found a day later on September 1 (Sent. Tr. II 
at 548, 588-89; H.C. Tr. at 352). The information was originally 
filed on September 2, 1987, two days after the murder (5th R. at 
72). On the same day, the State took the two sworn statements 
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now challenged by petitioner (H.C. Tr. at 69; see statements of 
Chad Williams and Beverly Ernest on file with this Court)- One 
statement was from the victim's widow, a California resident who 
was emotionally distraught, having lost her estranged husband to 
a brutal murder only two days earlier (H.C. Tr. at 60-61; Ernest 
Statement). The second statement came from a witness whose 
testimony and identification of petitioner was a key part of the 
prosecution's case and who was in fear of his life (H.C. Tr. at 
60, 67-68; Williams Statement). 
The reasonableness of questioning an identification 
witness and the widow of the murder victim during the initial 
stages of an investigation is clear. Defendant suggests that the 
prosecutor's precaution of taking the statements under oath 
changed the interviews into depositions, which he has a right to 
attend. He cites no authority providing that the State cannot 
conduct its investigatory interviews under oath or that, if it 
does so, defendant must be present (see discussion of rule 14, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, infra). Scott Burns, the Iron 
County Prosecuting Attorney, arranged to take the statements 
under oath in order to prepare and investigate his case (H.C. Tr. 
at 62, 71). The State neither used nor intended to use the 
statements at trial (H.C. Tr. at 65-66, 70). When the statements 
were made, the prosecutor did not know what petitioner's claims 
or defenses were (H.C. Tr. at 57-58), and he did not fully 
understand the events surrounding the murder (H.C. Tr. at 62-63), 
as evidenced by his filing of an amended information on September 
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10 (5th R. at 1-3). The State took at least four other 
unchallenged statements on or about September 2, seeking to "put 
everything in perspective" early in the case, including the 
timing and sequence of events (H.C. Tr. at 62-63). As the 
district court recognized, the case for both parties was at the 
investigatory stage. Petitioner took advantage of the State's 
investigation by using one statement during the penalty phase to 
attempt to impeach the victim's widow (Sent. Tr. Ill at 888-92). 
There is no evidence supporting petitioner's claim that 
the prosecution deliberately attempted to "create" testimony (Br. 
of App. at 13). There is no evidence that any of the information 
in the statements was false or that either individual would have 
testified differently at the penalty phase if they had not given 
their statements to the prosecutor under oath. The prosecution 
voluntarily opened its file to defense counsel, and the taking of 
the statements under oath memorialized the investigation and 
enabled the State to provide petitioner with a copy of the exact 
information its investigation uncovered. Use of both an oath and 
a reporter was merely a precaution occasionally used by the 
prosecutor and generated by the nature of the crime. 
The prosecutor's motives for conducting interviews 
under oath, and the timing and nature of the interviews, support 
the trial court's finding that the statements were investigative 
sworn statements. 
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B. Constitutional Violations 
As petitioner recognized, the district court did not 
address this issue on constitutional grounds. The court's 
failure is without consequence, however, as the issue is 
procedurally barred (see subsection A, supra). However, even if 
the court had addressed the constitutional grounds, it would have 
found no merit to counsel's argument. 
Petitioner initially asserts that the taking of the 
statements violated rule 14(h), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
and that the violation has constitutional significance (Br. of 
App. at 13-14). Rule 14(h) outlines the method by which either 
party in a criminal proceeding may preserve the testimony of any 
material witness whom the party has reason to believe will be 
unable to attend a trial or hearing; the party would apply to the 
court for an order permitting examination of the witness by 
deposition, giving notice to the opposing party (a copy of the 
rule is submitted herewith as Addendum E). Scott Burns, the 
prosecuting attorney, testified that his reasons for taking the 
statements in question were not those involved in rule 14(h) 
(H.C. Tr. at 69-70). Although he was concerned with the 
anxieties harbored by each individual (H.C. Tr. at 60-61), the 
record does not indicate that he had any belief or reason to 
believe that either would be unable to appear in court if 
necessary. In fact, both individuals testified at the penalty 
phase. Burns acknowledged not only that he did not intend to use 
the statements at trial, but that he knew he would likely not be 
14 
allowed to do so (H.C. Tr. at 70). He intended to gain and 
preserve the information for his own investigative use (H.C. Tr. 
at 62, 71). As the threshold for invoking rule 14(h) did not 
exist, any failure to proceed under the rule has no bearing here. 
Petitioner further argues that the prosecution's taking 
of sworn statements without his presence violated his right to 
confront and cross-examine the witnesses. The primary object of 
the right of confrontation is to prevent depositions and ex parte 
affidavits from being used against the accused at trial in lieu 
of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness 
against him. State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 1980). 
That object was not violated here as the prosecution did not use 
the sworn statements in court, and petitioner took full advantage 
of his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses, both of 
whom testified at the penalty phase. As noted above, the 
statements were sworn interviews of potential witnesses taken 
during an investigation two days after a murder. As they were 
not depositions, petitioner had no constitutional right to be 
present. Petitioner's comparison of these early, investigatory 
statements with the right to cross-examine witnesses at a 
preliminary hearing and the right to have counsel present during 
a pre-trial line-up is not helpful. The statements did not 
prevent petitioner from presenting evidence to the court, but 
provided him with potential impeachment material. 
Petitioner contends that the taking of sworn statements 
from key witnesses concerning key issues "permanently tainted" 
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the witnesses by freezing their testimony without benefit of 
cross-examination (Br. of App. at 17). This argument is purely 
speculative. Petitioner offers no proof that the witnesses' 
testimony was false or in any other manner "tainted." 
Petitioner's contention that the prosecution's mention 
of perjury to the victim's widow "locked in" her testimony is 
also speculative (Br. of App. at 16). Petitioner has not 
demonstrated that the testimony would have changed absent the 
prosecutor's reference to perjury or that the perjury reference 
resulted in testimony more favorable to the prosecution than 
might otherwise have been given. Oaths are administered to give 
a greater assurance of veracity, and a witness has a right to 
know the legal ramifications arising from testifying under oath. 
The district court affirmatively found that "the taking of the 
sworn statements [did not] in any way affect[] the testimony of 
the witnesses. . . . Had the witness been more closely cross-
examined by vigorous defense counsel there would have been no 
change." (3d R. at 261; Addendum D). Petitioner's speculative 
assertions do not establish a denial of his constitutional rights 
and are without merit. 
Finally, petitioner affirmatively used one sworn 
statements during the penalty phase, attempting to impeach the 
victim's widow (Sent. Tr. Ill at 888-92). He does not cite this 
as part of his counsel's ineffectiveness. Petitioner cannot use 
the statements, then complain that their existence constitutes 
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prejudicial error* See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 
(Utah 1989); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987). 
C. Abandonment of Ineffective Assistance Claim 
Petitioner presents this issue as a substantive due 
process violation only. When he first raised this issue 
substantively in the district court, he ceased to assert that the 
statements related to his trial counsel's allegedly ineffective 
representation (3d R. at 188-213; Addendum C). Although the 
district court addressed the issue under the ineffective 
assistance argument, petitioner does not challenge that ruling 
insofar as it relates to his counsel's performance. Accordingly, 
he has abandoned the claim as a basis for his ineffectiveness 
argument. See Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346, 
1348 (Utah 1983) (failure to include argument in brief on appeal 
constitutes abandonment of claim); Salt Lake City v. Towne House 
Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 420, 424 P.2d 442, 445 (1967); 
Linford v. Linford, 116 Utah 21, 26, 207 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1949); 
see also State v. Mova, 815 P.2d 1312, 1315 n.6 (Utah App. 1991). 
POINT II 
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE 
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT 
THE PENALTY PHASE 
A. Introduction 
Petitioner contends that his counsel at the sentencing 
proceedings rendered ineffective assistance, in violation of 
petitioner's sixth amendment right (Br. of App. at 18-42). He 
cites eight areas of conduct, one of which he claims individually 
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warrants reversal of his sentence, and all of which he claims 
cumulatively warrant reversal. 
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, petitioner must first show specific deficiencies which 
"fall outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance[,]" and second, establish a reasonable probability 
that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the 
trial would have been different. State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 
405 (Utah 1986); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
690, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 2071 (1984); State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118-
19 n.2 (Utah 1989). When petitioner challenges a death sentence, 
the focus of the second prong of the test becomes "whether there 
is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Proof of deficient performance must 
not be speculative but a demonstrable reality. State v. Jones, 
177 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah Dec. 31, 1991); Codianna v. Morris, 
660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983). A legitimate choice of trial 
strategy which fails to produce anticipated results does not 
constitute ineffective assistance, Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109, 
and petitioner has the burden of showing that counsel's actions 
were not conscious trial strategy. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 
155, 160 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1024 (1990); State 
v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). The court need not 
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determine whether petitioner has met the first prong of the test 
before examining the second prong fl'[i]£ it is easier to dispose 
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice[.]'" Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 697). This standard is applicable to claims of 
ineffective assistance claims in habeas proceedings. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (federal habeas); Bundv v. Deland, 
763 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1988) (state habeas); Codianna, 660 
P.2d at 1108-14 (state habeas). 
Although petitioner recognizes this two-part test, he 
urges this Court to abandon or limit application of the second 
(prejudice) prong and to focus on the first (substandard 
performance) prong (Br. of App. at 18-20). He argues that once 
he shows that counsel rendered deficient performance, he is 
entitled to reversal of his sentence whether or not counsel's 
conduct rendered the result of the sentencing proceedings 
unreliable. His suggestion that the mere existence of a 
deficiency is sufficient to warrant setting aside the sentencing 
outcome is without merit and was specifically rejected by the 
United States Supreme Court in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-94. 
The suggestion provides no workable principle as it requires the 
assumption of prejudice in areas where it is equally likely that 
no prejudice occurred. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 
The purpose of the constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel is to ensure a fair trial. Id.., 466 U.S. 
at 696-97; State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). To 
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that end, the overriding concern in reviewing a claim of 
ineffectiveness is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial or 
sentencing cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87; Templin, 805 P.2d at 186; Frame, 
723 P.2d at 405. In requiring proof of both deficient conduct 
and prejudice, the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland explained: 
An error by counsel, even if professionally 
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the 
judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no 
effect on the judgment, [citations omitted]. The 
purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is 
to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary 
to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. 
Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance 
must be prejudicial to the defense in order to 
constitute ineffective assistance under the 
Constitution. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. Given the fluid nature of the 
legal profession and the infinite variety and unpredictable 
nature of possible errors in counsel's conduct, a petitioner who 
establishes that certain errors by counsel were unreasonable must 
also show that the errors actually had an adverse effect on the 
defense. .Id.., 466 U.S. at 693; see also Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-
19; Frame, 723 P.2d at 405; State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645 (Utah 
1985). Both prongs apply equally to capital and non-capital 
cases. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87; State v. Gardner, 789 
P.2d 273, 288 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). 
Petitioner contends that, "by the nature of the issue 
presented[,]" the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), adopted the position that the second prong 
20 
of the test need not always be applied (Br. of App. at 20). To 
the contrary, in Tempiin, this Court specifically relied on both 
parts of the Strickland test in finding that Templin was denied 
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Templin involved a failure to reasonably investigate the 
availability of prospective defense witnesses. This Court 
specifically reiterated its position that "[d]efendant has the 
burden of meeting both parts of [the Strickland! test," and found 
that both parts of the test had been met. Templin, 805 P.2d at 
186. After first finding that counsel's performance was 
deficient, this Court reviewed the testimony that would have been 
given by the prospective witnesses and the totality of the 
evidence adduced at trial, id., 805 P.2d at 188. It found that 
the record did not strongly support the conviction, the expected 
testimony would have directly affected the credibility of the one 
person on whom the State's case rested, and the testimony would 
not have been cumulative. JEd. As the testimony affected the 
"entire evidentiary picture," it was of sufficient import to 
establish a reasonable probability that the outcome would have 
been different had the witnesses testified at trial. Id. 
Petitioner must meet both prongs of the Strickland test 
to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. His 
failure to demonstrate in any of his claims either that his trial 
counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by 
that performance will be addressed individually hereafter. 
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B. Inadequate Pre-trial Investigation 
Petitioner contends that his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient because counsel undertook substandard 
pretrial investigation into the victim's alleged homosexual 
tendencies and failed to seek an autopsy of the victim to look 
for physical signs of homosexual activity (Br. of App. at 21). 
Petitioner argues that this conduct alone warrants reversal of 
his death sentence without the need to inquire into the existence 
of prejudice (Jd. at 22)/ 
Petitioner's failure to establish the requisite 
prejudice defeats his claim of ineffective assistance.5 
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1110. Petitioner also fails to make the 
showing required under the first prong of the test. Although he 
identifies counsel's allegedly substandard performance, 
petitioner does not show how the performance was deficient. 
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland spoke 
directly to the issue of the adequacy of pretrial investigation: 
[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation 
of law and facts relevant to plausible options are 
virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made 
after less than complete investigation are reasonable 
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation. In 
A
 Although petitioner opines that some of the claims of 
deficient conduct by themselves justify reversal of his sentence, 
he identifies only this issue as being individually sufficient. 
5
 Contrary to petitioner's assertion that some issues do not 
lend themselves to proof of prejudice under the second prong of the 
test, prejudice has been required and ineffectiveness found where 
defendants have alleged insufficient investigation by counsel. 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 187-89; State v. Crestani, 771 >.2d 1085, 
1091-92 (Utah App. 1989). 
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other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that 
makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any 
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to 
investigate must be directly assessed for 
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a 
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments, 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. See generally Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 188 (a decision to cease investigation may be a tactical 
decision following adequate initial inquiry). In this case, the 
record illustrates that counsel's investigation was adequate to 
support his decision not to investigate the matter further. 
Petitioner's expert at the evidentiary hearing 
indicated that a failure to conduct any investigation would be 
substandard (H.C. Tr. at 81). Judge James Shumate, petitioner's 
trial counsel, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he, in 
fact, investigated the victim's sexual orientation. Counsel 
recognized that the victim's sexual preference was important as 
potential substantiation for the defense petitioner asserted and 
as a potentially mitigating circumstance (H.C. Tr. at 16-17, 31). 
He indicated that M[he] was concerned from the outset[,] because 
of [petitioner's] relation to [counsel] of the events surrounding 
the homicide, as to whether or not there might be any indication 
that the decedent was, in fact, prone to homosexual tendencies, 
had any homosexual background, or orientation whatsoever." (H.C. 
Tr. at 16-17). Judge Shumate spoke with the victim's family 
members, the victim's widow, the victim's stepfather, and Bruce 
Opp, a friend of the victim for two years (Sent. Tr. II at 679, 
692; H.C. Tr. at 15-18, 21-22). Although the exact content of 
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counsel's investigation was not revealed, the record provides a 
clear picture of counsel's findings. The victim's widow, who had 
been married to the victim for ten years, emphatically testified 
at the penalty hearing that the victim did not have homosexual 
tendencies (Sent, Tr. Ill at 883; Sent. Tr. IV at 1187-89), that 
he dated other women (Sent. Tr. IV at 1189), and that he had an 
affair with another woman (Ici. ) . Her sworn statement, provided 
to Judge Shumate by the prosecution the same month it was taken 
(H.C. Tr. at 44), indicated that the victim had a girlfriend at 
the time she first met him (Ernest Statement at 4), and that he 
had "a very good friend" whom he had kissed and "cared for very 
much[.]" (Ernest Statement at 32). Opp testified that 
homosexuality "was the farthest thing from [the victim's] mind" 
and that the victim dated other women once he became estranged 
from his wife (Sent. Tr. IV at 1177). Even the prosecution's 
investigation failed to reveal evidence of any homosexual 
tendencies (H.C. Tr. at 56-59). 
Counsel conducted adequate investigation into the issue 
to permit a reasoned determination concerning further 
investigation. His decision not to proceed further in the face 
of the information obtained from the victim's family and friends 
is a reasonable tactical decision which does not amount to 
deficient performance. See, e.g., Strickland, 446 U.S. at 690-
91; Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1110. 
Petitioner merely assumes that actual evidence of 
homosexual tendencies might have been found which may have 
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resulted in a different sentencing outcome. The record indicates 
that the contrary is more likely. In addition to the information 
outlined above, the record contains testimony from the victim's 
father-in-law and uncle-in-law who testified at the penalty phase 
that the victim had no homosexual tendencies (Sent. Tr. IV at 
1176-77, 1180-81, 1184-85). The victim stayed with Bruce Opp one 
night following his separation from his wife, but he slept in his 
van outside Opp's home (Sent. Tr. Ill at 830).6 The evidence 
belies the likelihood that any evidence of the victim's alleged 
homosexuality would have been found. Further investigation 
likely would not have resulted in a different outcome in the 
sentencing proceedings. Absent evidence that counsel's failure 
to investigate further prejudiced petitioner, that failure cannot 
establish ineffective assistance. Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1110. 
C. Deficient Guilty Plea Advice 
Petitioner next argues that he received ineffective 
representation because his counsel advised him to plead guilty as 
charged to capital homicide, aggravated robbery, and theft. He 
argues that the advice to plead guilty was not a legitimate trial 
strategy but was deficient because his counsel mistakenly led him 
to believe that the plea was in his best interests when in fact 
he received no "benefit" from the bargain (Br. of App. at 24-25). 
6
 In contrast, the Iron County Attorney testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that his investigation indicated that 
petitioner was known to have had a homosexual partner while 
incarcerated in a Nevada prison and had demonstrated homosexual 
tendencies while in the Iron County Jail (H.C. Tr. at 58, 72). 
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This challenge to petitioner's guilty plea necessarily 
fails because he does not make the required allegation that there 
is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial absent counsel's 
advice. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 
(1985) (when a claim of ineffective counsel involves a guilty 
plea, the prejudice requirement focuses on whether counsel's 
actions affected the outcome of the plea process). Even if the 
allegation had been made, petitioner's repeated assertions of 
guilt, both before and after entering his plea, and his adamant 
desire to end the preliminary hearing make it unlikely that he 
would have insisted on going to trial. 
The claim also fails because counsel's advice 
constituted a legitimate trial strategy, and petitioner has 
failed to prove otherwise. The fact that it did not have the 
anticipated result does not render counsel's representation 
deficient. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160. Judge Shumate testified in 
detail at the evidentiary hearing regarding the purpose behind 
entering the plea: to blunt the thrust of the evidence to be 
presented to the penalty phase jury in hopes of finding the jury 
more amenable to a sentence other than death (H.C. Tr. at 29-30). 
Petitioner admitted at both the preliminary and the evidentiary 
hearings that he killed the victim (H.C. Tr. at 43-44, 51, 63). 
Judge Shumate determined that a guilt phase would allow the State 
the opportunity to emphasize and re-emphasize the crimes in 
detail to the jury (H.C. Tr. at 29-30). He also recognized the 
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possibility that once the jury had seen the evidence throughout 
the guilt phase, the emotional momentiom likely to be generated by 
the details of the homicide would be against petitioner and could 
render the jury more likely to impose a death sentence during the 
penalty phase (H.C. Tr. at 30). He discussed this strategy and 
the possibility of entering a guilty plea with petitioner at 
length, providing petitioner with the opportunity to fully 
consider the move (H.C. Tr. at 27-30, 47-48). Petitioner 
admitted that before he entered his plea, he knew the evidence 
the State possessed (H.C. Tr. at 45-46), he knew that he would 
still face the penalty phase (5th R. at 81-82; H.C. Tr. at 51-
52), and he knew the State had a good chance of getting the death 
penalty (H.C. Tr. at 47). Despite his self-serving claim that 
Judge Shumate told him that there was only Ma possibility of 
getting the death penalty[,]" (id..), petitioner knew that he 
could still receive a death sentence (H.C. Tr. at 47, 51-52, 54), 
and that his counsel's opinion was not binding (5th R. at 82-83). 
Judge Shumate's judgment, analysis and determination were made in 
light of his extensive prior trial experience, including more 
than eleven years as a defense attorney handling more than 150 
jury trials, and experience as associate counsel on one prior 
capital case and as lead counsel on two prior capital cases (H.C. 
Tr. at 8-11, 35-36). Under the circumstances of this case, this 
strategy clearly meets an objective standard of reasonableness, 
and counsel's advice pursuant to this strategy lies within the 
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wide range of professionally competent assistance. Frame, 723 
P.2d at 405. 
Petitioner's contention that the lack of any 
"meaningful benefit" from the plea bargain renders counsel's 
representation deficient has no basis in the record. Plea 
bargaining is both tolerated and encouraged by our legal system. 
Bordenkircher v. Haves, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65, 98 S. Ct. 663, 667-
68 (1978). The "mutuality of advantage" upon which plea 
bargaining is based was satisfied in this case. See id., 434 
U.S. at 363; State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988). Both 
petitioner and Judge Shumate testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that the plea was primarily based on petitioner's strong desire 
to waive his preliminary hearing (H.C. Tr. at 26-27, 44-46, 
63).7 Article 1, section 13 of the Utah Constitution and rule 
7(7)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permit a petitioner to 
waive his preliminary hearing with the prosecution's consent. 
The prosecution withheld its consent in this case for three 
legitimate reasons: 1) to preserve testimony created at the 
preliminary hearing; 2) to avoid the possibility that a future 
defect in the trial would be claimed because of the waiver; and 
3) to avoid the possibility that a potential change of counsel 
between the preliminary hearing and the trial might result in a 
defect because necessary evidence was not established in the 
record (H.C. Tr. at 63-64, 100-01). The bargain ultimately 
7
 The plea bargain is addressed further in subsection F, 
infra. 
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struck by the parties required that the State relinquish its 
concerns and permit waiver of the preliminary hearing in exchange 
for a guilty plea. In return, petitioner gained several 
benefits: 1) the ability to employ the strategy outlined above; 
2) the cessation of the preliminary hearing proceedings as 
adamantly desired by petitioner; 3) the return of certain items 
of clothing; and 4) the return of money petitioner possessed when 
arrested (5th R. at 79-86; H.C. Tr. at 47-48). Additionally, 
petitioner agreed to plead guilty to only one of the numerous 
aggravating circumstances alleged in the information: a previous 
conviction for a violent felony (H.C. Tr. at 24-25). As this 
Court recognized in the direct appeal, "[i]t is clear from the 
record that great care was taken to ascertain the voluntariness 
of his plea." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1280 (Utah 1989). 
The benefits petitioner received were clearly 
meaningful to him, despite his assertions to the contrary. 
Petitioner actively sought to waive the preliminary hearing 
before it began (H.C. Tr. at 27, 45). When Judge Shumate's 
attempts to secure the prosecution's consent failed, the hearing 
commenced. Judge Shumate testified that once the preliminary 
hearing started, petitioner "was extremely agitated and upset . . 
. [and] had no desire whatsoever to go through [with it]." (H.C. 
Tr. at 27). Shumate explained that not only did petitioner want 
the proceedings stopped, but he "became extremely adamant, 
basically said, I don't want this to go farther any more" and 
authorized counsel to "just do whatever it takes to get this 
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thing stopped." (id.). Scott Burns indicated that petitioner 
made similar statements in open court at the preliminary hearing 
(H.C. Tr. at 63). Petitioner readily admitted his repeated 
attempts to waive the preliminary hearing (H.C. Tr. at 44-46). 
Further, petitioner thought the clothing and money sufficiently 
important below to actively pursue them before any plea agreement 
was struck (5th R. at 54-55), and to push the prosecution to 
return them to him when the State's performance was delayed (5th 
R. at 96-97, 107-08). 
Entering a guilty plea was a valid legal strategy, and 
defendant received the benefit he bargained for. He has not 
shown that absent counsel's advice he would have insisted on 
going to trial. Accordingly, counsel's recommendation to enter 
the guilty plea was not ineffective representation. 
D. Inadequate Juror/Witness Contact Investigation 
Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective 
because, after a witness and a juror had contact at the penalty 
phase, counsel did not actively examine the witness, did not ask 
the juror if he had been influenced by the contact, and 
specifically waived the issue for appellate review by commenting 
that he saw no prejudice from the contact (Br. of App. at 26-27). 
Petitioner relies heavily on the "strict approach" to 
juror/witness contact taken by this Court in State v. Pike, 712 
P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 1985). However, when faced with 
petitioner's substantive challenge to the contact on direct 
appeal, this Court held that "[e]ven analyzing the facts under 
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the standards provided in fPikel, . . . we could find no error." 
Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1285 (citation omitted). Where there was no 
substantive error arising from the contact, counsel's waiver of 
the "error" and his failure to more vigorously interrogate the 
witness and the juror cannot constitute ineffective assistance. 
See Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109; State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 
58 (Utah 1982) (a failure to act when the act would have proven 
futile will not establish ineffective assistance). 
E. Failure to File a Formal Discovery Motion 
Petitioner next complains that his counsel was 
ineffective because he did not file a formal discovery request 
and that his sentence should be vacated solely because of 
counsel's allegedly improper conduct. He expressly fails to 
establish any prejudice from the lack of a formal discovery 
motion, claiming that, under State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 
1985), he has "lost forever the right to discover and apply 
information that may exist." (Br. of App. at 30). In Booker, 
defense counsel did not make the discovery request required under 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16 (1982), either written or oral, at any 
time. Booker, 709 P.2d at 346. He was therefore unable to 
assert error in the prosecution's failure to provide him with a 
police report prior to trial. .Id. Booker is inapposite to this 
case, as petitioner here presents a constitutional argument and 
does not contest the evidence that the prosecution had an open 
file policy and provided all information to defense counsel as it 
was received. Petitioner does not claim that undiscovered 
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information existed during trial or was found subsequent to trial 
which affects this case. Speculation that exculpatory evidence 
may be found in the future which may be adversely affected by the 
lack of a formal discovery motion will not support a finding of 
ineffective assistance. State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1068 
(Utah 1988) (mere speculation is insufficient); Bundv, 763 P.2d 
at 806. Because there does not appear to be any possibility of 
prejudice to petitioner due to the lack of a formal motion, 
petitioner's claim must be denied. See State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 
1207, 1210 (Utah App. 1991). 
Although petitioner's failure to meet the second 
(prejudice) prong of the ineffectiveness test defeats this claim, 
he also fails to meet the first prong. Petitioner cites no 
authority holding that the failure to file written discovery 
requests constitutes per se ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See, e.g., State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah App. 1992) 
(failure to file formal discovery motion is not per se 
ineffective assistance). As long as counsel adequately 
investigated the case through methods other than by formal 
discovery, his failure to file a written motion would not 
constitute deficient performance. See id., 840 P.2d at 791-92. 
In this case, counsel adequately investigated the case, in part 
through an informal discovery arrangement with the prosecution 
whereby both parties had access to any information in the police 
or county attorney's files (H.C. Tr. at 22-24, 35, 59). The 
prosecutor voluntarily provided defense counsel with copies of 
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various documents, acquiring an on-going duty to disclose any 
material which he may discover. State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 
916-17 (Utah 1987). No breach of that duty has been alleged by 
petitioner. Further, the prosecutor testified that everything he 
used or discovered was given to defense counsel (H.C. Tr. at 59), 
and defense counsel testified that everything used by the State 
at trial had been made available to him previously (H.C. Tr. at 
35). Petitioner has not shown that the failure to formalize the 
discovery arrangement in this case prevented his counsel from 
obtaining any information not already made available to him. 
Where counsel discovered all relevant information, his failure to 
file a formal discovery motion cannot constitute ineffective 
assistance. See Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109, 1113 (failure to 
file motions or object when such conduct would add nothing to the 
proceedings does not establish ineffective assistance). 
F. Failure to Prevent Entry of Plea 
Petitioner avers that the prosecutor unconstitutionally 
coerced his guilty plea, and that trial counsel was ineffective 
in not preventing petitioner from entering the plea, not 
challenging at the preliminary hearing the constitutionality of 
the prosecutor's refusal to consent to waiver of the preliminary 
hearing, and not attacking the guilty plea on appeal based on 
duress by the prosecution (Br. of App. at 32-33). He does not 
claim any prejudice from this allegedly deficient conduct. 
Petitioner essentially argues that Judge Shumate should 
have fought to obtain the waiver of the preliminary hearing 
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without entering the plea bargain. However, the entry of the 
plea not only was a means by which to waive the hearing, but, as 
previously established, was a tactical decision made in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment (see subsection C, 
supra). Because the prosecution would consider no other plea 
arrangement (H.C. Tr. at 29, 45, 63-64), a refusal to enter the 
plea would have resulted in continuation of the preliminary 
hearing, and the defensive strategy behind the plea would have 
been lost to petitioner. The existence of other options 
considered more reasonable by appellate counsel does not render 
trial counsel's conduct ineffective. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160; 
Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023-24. This Court will not second-guess 
the strategic decisions of trial counsel. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 
160; Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1110. As petitioner has not 
established that counsel's failure to pursue waiver of the 
preliminary hearing in lieu of entering a plea was not a 
reasonable strategic decision or that petitioner was prejudiced 
by counsel's failure to so act, petitioner's ineffectiveness 
claim should be denied. 
Petitioner also challenges trial counsel's failure to 
attack the guilty plea on appeal based on the prosecution's 
alleged exercise of duress in obtaining the plea. However, he 
fails to establish how such conduct is deficient. The State's 
consent to waiver of the preliminary hearing is required by rule 
and by state constitution. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(7)(a); Utah Const, 
art. I, § 13. Petitioner cites no authority for his suggestion 
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that the prosecutor's use in the plea bargaining process of his 
consent to the preliminary hearing waiver is reversible error. 
Withholding consent does not rise to the level of duress merely 
because petitioner is adamant about his desire to waive the 
preliminary hearing. Any duress which may have existed did not 
make the plea any less a tactical decision or a reasonable 
exercise of trial counsel's judgment. A challenge to the plea on 
direct appeal would have suggested invited error, which is looked 
on with disfavor by appellate courts. Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1280; 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987). In this 
case, counsel's failure to challenge the plea on appeal is within 
an objective standard of reasonableness and, hence, is not 
deficient performance. 
G. Inadequate Trial Preparation 
Petitioner contends that his trial counsel spent an 
inadequate amount of time with him outside of the courtroom and 
that this conduct is sufficiently deficient to warrant reversal 
of his death sentence. Instead of establishing how the amount of 
time spent together constituted deficient performance, petitioner 
urges this Court to hold that it is per se ineffective for 
counsel in a capital case to meet with his client outside the 
courtroom for a total of between four and twenty hours (Br. of 
App. at 33-34). Once again petitioner fails to show how this 
allegedly deficient conduct resulted in prejudice. 
This Court has not established the arbitrary time limit 
petitioner seeks to create in order to measure defense counsel's 
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performance, and petitioner provides no legal authority to do so 
here. Instead, by noting the disparate estimates given by 
himself and Judge Shumate regarding time spent together on the 
case and arguing that Shumate was not credible, petitioner seeks 
a re-evaluation of the district court's credibility 
determination. He fails to show that additional time spent with 
his trial counsel would have yielded any information not already 
available to counsel at trial. 
The time counsel actually spent with petitioner was a 
fraction of the time he spent on the case as a whole. Judge 
Shumate testified that he spent eight to ten hours on the case 
prior to the preliminary hearing, 400 to 500 hours total working 
on the case, and 100 hours taking the direct appeal (H.C. Tr. at 
28-29, 34-35, 37-39). He outlined the type of work he undertook, 
including the use of extensive discovery. In addition to the 
evidence he ultimately adduced at the penalty phase, counsel 
discovered what evidence the State would later present to the 
sentencing jury. Absent a suggestion of what relevant additional 
information would have been revealed had counsel spent more time 
with petitioner, counsel's failure to meet further with 
petitioner should not be presumed to be deficient or prejudicial. 
H. Failure to Conduct Adequate Voir Dire 
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered 
deficient performance by failing to conduct an adequate voir dire 
from which an appellate court could determine whether a change of 
venue should have been sought due to publicity about the murder 
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(Br. of App. at 36). Counsel's alleged failure to make the 
necessary record, petitioner argues, should release him from the 
burden of establishing prejudice under the second prong of the 
Strickland test (id.). However, the record is sufficient to 
establish that the publicity did not affect the impartiality of 
the seated jurors and that counsel's failure to seek a change of 
venue was not ineffective assistance. 
Although an accused must be tried by a fair and 
impartial jury, he is not entitled to be tried by a jury that has 
heard nothing about his case. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797 
(Utah 1991); State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1250 (Utah 1988), 
habeas corpus granted on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 
1991). The fact that most of the jurors had some exposure to the 
case does not establish a due process violation. Gardner, 789 
P.2d at 277. The voir dire process need only establish the 
impartiality of the jurors. Id., 789 P.2d at 277-78; State v. 
James, 767 P.2d 549, 551 (Utah 1989). This Court has not 
mandated the questions to be asked in voir dire. See James, 819 
P.2d at 797; State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844 (Utah 1983). 
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, sufficiently thorough 
questioning of the venire occurred here. The district court 
questioned the venire individually in chambers, asking each 
prospective juror what information he or she had received about 
the case, the source of the information, and whether he or she 
had formed an opinion about petitioner's sentence based on what 
they had heard (Sent. Tr. IA & IB at 95-100, 117-20, 126-29, 165-
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67, 207-09, 268-71, 290-95, 314-18, 348-50, 378-83, 412-14, 418-
21; a copy of the relevant voir dire of the seated jury is 
submitted herewith as Addendum F). Following the questioning, 
the district court was satisfied with the jurors' impartiality. 
Neither the record nor petitioner's argument to this Court 
demonstrate any error in that determination. Some of the seated 
jurors had no media exposure at all (H.C. Tr. at 207-09, 412-14, 
418-21), and the remaining jurors either had formed no opinion or 
had formulated light impressions which they were willing to set 
aside in order to listen to the evidence and apply the law (Sent, 
Tr- IA & IB at 95-100, 117-20, 126-29, 165-67, 268-71, 290-95, 
314-18, 348-50, 378-83; Addendum F). This is sufficient to 
establish the impartiality of the jury. Gardner, 789 P.2d at 
277-78; Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1250-51. Petitioner has failed to 
explain what additional questions should have been asked and how 
those questions would have caused a different result. Hence, he 
has not demonstrated how the original voir dire was insufficient. 
I. Failure to Further Object to the Special Verdict Forms 
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the use of the 
special verdict forms on the grounds that they: 1) "misled" the 
jury to impose the death penalty; 2) improperly allowed the jury 
to consider as an aggravating circumstance an offense not 
identified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978); and 3) permitted 
the jury to find three aggravating factors where only one was 
available by law (Br. of App. at 38-41). He contends that this 
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conduct unfairly exposed him to a greater likelihood of receiving 
the death penalty than otherwise permitted by law. 
In petitioner's direct appeal, this Court rejected the 
argument that the special verdict forms misled the jury toward 
finding aggravating circumstances and imposing the death 
sentence. Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1280. Accordingly, any objection 
by petitioner's trial counsel on the basis that the forms 
encouraged the rendering of a death sentence would have had no 
effect on the outcome of the proceedings, and his failure to make 
the objection would not constitute ineffective assistance. 
Colonna, 766 P.2d at 1067-68; Codiarma, 660 P.2d at 1109, 1113. 
Petitioner asserts that the use as an aggravating 
circumstance in the special verdict forms of the fact that he was 
a parolee in possession of a firearm required an objection by his 
trial counsel. This circumstance does not appear in the listed 
circumstances in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978), which 
pertained to determining petitioner's guilt in 1987 and 1988 (a 
copy of the statute is submitted herewith as Addendum G). 
However, petitioner had already pled guilty; only the penalty 
phase remained. Determination of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances for purposes of imposing an appropriate penalty is 
not limited to the circumstances listed in the statute* 
Sentencing for a capital felony in 1988 was governed by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-207 (1978) (a copy of the statute is submitted 
herewith as Addendum H). The aggravating factors listed in § 76-
5-202 are expressly included in the aggravating circumstances for 
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sentencing purposes, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1978). However, 
aggravating circumstances for sentencing are not limited to the 
factors listed in § 76-5-202. The fact that petitioner was a 
parolee in possession of a firearm constituted information about 
his "character, background, [and] history" as permitted by § 76-
3-207 for sentencing purposes. It was properly included as an 
aggravating factor in the sentencing phase, and counsel's failure 
to object to the factor does not amount to deficient performance. 
Petitioner also argues that counsel should have 
objected to the special verdict forms because they listed two 
statutory aggravating circumstances, i.e., in the course of a 
robbery and committed for pecuniary gain, which enhanced the 
likelihood of the death penalty because it divided a single act 
into two aggravating circumstances. However, the facts 
demonstrate that each aggravating circumstance was a separate 
act. The evidence produced at the penalty hearing was that 
petitioner killed Richard Ernest and took personal property 
(Ernest's wallet, his car, and the personal effects and tools in 
the car) from his person or immediate presence by using a 
dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978) (a copy of 
the statute is submitted herewith as Addendum I). Petitioner 
later used Ernest's identity and credit cards to secure lodging 
and to purchase items at a retail store. The latter acts were a 
pecuniary or personal gain separate from the robbery. Hence, a 
single act was not divided into two aggravating circumstances. 
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Even if petitioner's argument were correct, the 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a 
numerical function. The jury was instructed to consider the 
totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, to 
determine if the total aggravating outweighed the total 
mitigating beyond a reasonable doubt, and that they must find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty was justified 
and appropriate (5th R. at 265, Instruction No. 12; copy 
submitted herewith as Addendum J). The jury was specifically 
instructed not to weigh the circumstances in terms of relative 
numbers (Addendum J). The jury can be presumed to have followed 
the instructions and to have looked at the totality of the 
circumstances in performing their weighing function. State v. 
Gardunio, 652 P. 2d 1342, 1344 (Utah 1982). That homicide in the 
course of a robbery and homicide committed for pecuniary gain 
were given as separate circumstances does not mean that the jury 
gave them improper weight. 
Counsel's challenged performance was not prejudicial to 
petitioner. This Court, in the direct appeal, found that "the 
[sentencing] court instructed the jury in meticulous compliance 
with the standards set forth in State v. Wood and section 76-3-
207 and the special verdict questions and instructions did not 
conflict with these standards[.]" Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1280. 
Because there was no prejudice from the giving of the 
instructions and special verdict forms, there would be no 
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prejudice stemming from counsel's failure to object thereto on 
the grounds argued by petitioner. 
J. Cumulative Effect of Ineffectiveness Claims 
Petitioner contends that while some of his claims of 
ineffective assistance, taken separately, do not justify reversal 
of his sentence, their cumulative effect establishes that his 
counsel's ineffective representation (Br. of App. at 20). 
The cumulative error doctrine applies only where 
petitioner establishes the existence of reversible error. Lairby 
v. Barnes, 793 P.2d 377, 378 (Utah 1990); State v. Johnson, 784 
P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989); Bundv, 763 P.2d at 806. None of the 
individual points raised by petitioner have been shown to be 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Each instance of trial 
counsel's allegedly deficient performance consisted of counsel's 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment or his omission of 
objections or formal motions which would have had no effect on 
the proceedings. There is not a likelihood or even a significant 
possibility that any of the alleged errors prejudiced 
petitioner's right to a fair trial, and he has not shown that the 
results of the sentencing proceedings were unreliable. 
Accordingly, his request for relief based on cumulative error 
should be denied. Lairbv, 793 P.2d at 378. 
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POINT III 
PETITIONER IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED 
TO REPRESENTATION AT STATE EXPENSE IN 
PURSUING HABEAS RELIEF OR APPEALS THEREFROM 
A, Introduction and District Court's Ruling 
Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare, as a 
matter of state and federal constitutional law, that the State of 
Utah must pay attorney's fees and costs for work done on an 
inmate's behalf in connection with his initial state habeas 
corpus proceedings and the first appeal therefrom (Br, of App. at 
42).8 He equates the right to seek habeas review with the right 
to take a direct appeal, claiming that once a state grants either 
right, it must provide counsel to indigent inmates (Id. at 44-45). 
Although voicing concern both for the inmate who must 
rely on pro bono representation and for the lawyers "constrained" 
to provide such services, the district court simultaneously 
recognized the "superb" representation given petitioner in this 
matter and the fact that the question is one for legislative, not 
judicial, resolution (3d R. at 265, 280-81; Addendum D). Because 
petitioner has no constitutional right to counsel in a collateral 
Habeas corpus proceedings necessarily involve challenges 
which impact on a defendant's conviction and/or sentence. 
Petitioner seeks payment "for the work done in the district court 
and for the work done in connection with this appeal." (Br. of App. 
at 42). This relief should not be granted by this Court as it 
benefits petitioner's current counsel alone and does not impact on 
petitioner's sentence or conviction. If this Court finds a 
constitutional right to counsel at state expense in this matter, it 
should not grant the requested relief but should remand the case 
for the appointment of counsel and a new evidentiary hearing, 
ordering the state to pay costs and fees incurred on petitioner's 
behalf in the new proceeding. 
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review of his conviction, the State has no obligation to pay 
attorney's fees for his counsel's representation of him in either 
the initial habeas proceedings or this appeal therefrom. 
B. Federal Constitution 
1. Waiver 
Petitioner waived federal constitutional review by 
conceding the issue in the district court. The State submitted a 
memorandum to the district court in support of its motion for 
partial summary judgment, using federal law to argue that 
petitioner has no constitutional right to counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings (3d R. at 46-47; copy submitted herewith 
as Addendum K). In response, petitioner argued that the State's 
position must fail because 
"it relies upon the U.S. Supreme Court decision that 
states are not required to appoint counsel for indigent 
death row inmates seeking state post conviction relief. 
That determination is, of course, made under the 
federal Constitution [sic]. As explained above in 
great detail, the Utah Constitution takes an entirely 
different approach to a writ of habeas corpus." 
(3d R. at 92; copy submitted herewith as Addendum L). The 
remainder of petitioner's response focused solely on the state 
constitution (3d R. at 92-94; Addendum L). Six days later, 
petitioner filed a more specific statement of his habeas claims 
(3d R. at 113-21; copy submitted herewith as Addendum M). That 
statement expressly ties his claim for costs and attorney's fees 
to the state constitution, ignoring completely the federal 
constitution (3d R. at 120; Addendum M). Hence, petitioner has 
abandoned his federal claim. 
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2. Merits 
Generally, the State would rely on its waiver argument 
and ask this Court to procedurally bar petitioner's argument in 
this appeal. However, given this Court's position of broadly 
addressing all issues in direct appeals involving capital cases, 
the State includes a brief argument on the applicable case law 
should this Court reach the merits of petitioner's argument. 
Petitioner recognizes in his opening brief the 
existence of United States Supreme Court case law which is 
directly contrary to the position he takes on this issue before 
this Court (Br. of App. at 45). He then summarily states that 
the cases "are distinguishable from the circumstances here[,]" 
and "reserves argument for an appropriate response in a reply 
brief should the state elect to rely upon these cases." (Id.). 
He provides no legal analysis and makes no attempt to distinguish 
the cases. This ploy requires the State to make petitioner's 
argument for him before it can show that the argument has no 
merit. The State has no responsibility to make petitioner's 
argument, and petitioner should not be allowed to distinguish the 
cases in his reply brief, to which the State cannot respond. 
Petitioner cites two United States Supreme Court cases 
in support of his assertion that he has a federal right to 
counsel at state expense in state habeas proceedings wherein he 
raises a new issue for the first time: Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 
600, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
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353, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963).9 Although both cases provide that an 
indigent inmate has a constitutional right to appointed counsel 
in his first appeal of right, neither case expands its holding to 
discretionary appeals in state courts as petitioner urges. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 610, 612, 616 (neither the due process 
clause nor the equal protection clause of the federal 
constitution requires that states provide indigents with counsel 
to pursue state-granted discretionary appeals in state courts); 
Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356 (expressly limiting its holding to cases 
where an indigent inmate is denied appointed counsel in his first 
appeal of right). Accordingly, both cases are inapposite to 
petitioner's claim. 
The cases recognized without discussion by petitioner 
as contrary to his position are determinative of this issue. In 
Pennsylvania v. Finlev, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987), the 
Supreme Court reiterated and applied its holding in Moffitt that 
the federal constitutional right of indigent prisoners to 
appointed counsel which exists in a direct appeal does not exist 
in state postconviction proceedings. Id.., 481 U.S. at 555, 557 
(Moffitt's holding and rationale "apply with even more force to 
postconviction review."). The Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
position in both Finlev and Moffitt in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 
U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (concluding that this rule "should 
apply no differently in capital cases than in noncapital 
9
 He makes no assertion for relief based on the due process 
clause of the federal constitution. 
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cases."), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 83 (1990). These decisions 
require rejection of petitioner's position. 
C. State Constitution 
Petitioner seeks to expand his state constitutional 
rights because he is an indigent capital defendant raising a new 
issue for the first time in postconviction proceedings (Br. of 
App. at 48).10 Utah courts have not expanded the right to 
appointed counsel beyond the first appeal of right, and 
petitioner cites no other jurisdiction which has interpreted its 
own state constitution in the manner he now advocates. 
Petitioner begins his argument by urging that the right 
to appointed counsel which attaches to the state-granted right to 
a direct appeal applies equally to the state-granted right to 
habeas review (Br. of App. at 46-47). He provides no legal 
support or policy for this parallel. The privilege of habeas 
review in Utah's constitution comes from its federal counterpart, 
10
 As the district court correctly found, the question of state 
payment of costs and attorney's fees incurred by indigent inmates 
in postconviction proceedings is a legislative function, and the 
legislature has not provided for the relief sought by petitioner. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990) (the duties of counsel assigned to 
represent indigent defendants includes "the taking of a first 
appeal of right and the prosecuting of other remedies before or 
after a conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in 
the interest of justice except for other and subsequent 
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.M) 
(emphasis added); Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-3(2) (1990) ("assigned 
counsel shall not have the duty or power under this section to 
represent an indigent defendant in any discretionary appeal or 
action for a discretionary writ, other than in a meaningful first 
appeal of right . . • • M ) ; see also Turtle Management, Inc. v. 
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982) (Utah 
"adheres to the well-established rule that attorney's fees 
generally cannot be recovered unless provided for by statute or 
contract."). Petitioner presents no statutory argument. 
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U.S. Const., art. I, §9, and the inclusion of habeas review in 
the state constitution separate and apart from the right to a 
direct appeal suggests that the privileges are not to be granted 
identical treatment. Utah Const, art. 1, § 5 (habeas), § 12 
(direct appeal). While a direct appeal seeks to insure against 
errors which occurred at the trial level and which are apparent 
in the record, see, e.g., State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 
(Utah 1985) (requiring an adequate record before alleged errors 
may be reviewed on the merits), postconviction review 
historically arises from the common-law writ of error coram nobis 
and provides the method by which a district court may look into 
facts which do not appear on the face of the record but which 
establish that the prisoner has been deprived of his right to a 
fair trial. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). 
These differences support the federal position that direct and 
collateral review do not carry identical constitutional 
requirements, dictating against identical treatment thereof. 
Petitioner provides no authority or analysis for the 
distinction of capital and noncapital postconviction proceedings, 
arguing only that an indigent capital inmate has no reasonable 
access to habeas review absent appointment of counsel at state 
expense. Death row inmates have the same reasonable access to 
state habeas review as any other incarcerated noncapital indigent 
defendant. The fact that Utah courts grant capital cases a more 
expansive scope of review on direct appeal, State v. Menzies, 182 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah Mar. 11, 1992), does not dictate that 
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capital cases require application of heightened review in habeas 
proceedings. See Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 8-10 (finding that the 
special safeguards accompanying the guilt and penalty phases at 
the trial level and the first direct appeal provide the degree of 
reliability required to impose the death penalty, and making no 
distinction in federal habeas proceedings between the rights of 
capital and noncapital case petitioners, both of whom must meet 
the same standards in establishing error). Petitioner provides 
no basis for this Court to depart from the federal rationale. 
The severity of petitioner's sentence does not justify an 
expansion of his state constitutional rights in postconviction 
proceedings beyond those afforded other indigent inmates. See 
Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812, 815 (Utah) (in an appeal from the 
dismissal of a habeas petition, this Court held that "[t]he 
severity of the death penalty standing alone does not render it 
unconscionable for this Court to deny further review."), cert, 
denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). This is especially true where, as 
here, petitioner not only obtained habeas review, but benefitted 
from "superb" representation by pro bono counsel. 
Petitioner urges that he is entitled to counsel because 
his habeas petition includes a "new" claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. However, raising a new issue in 
postconviction proceedings which requires the taking of evidence 
has not been held to convert a collateral proceeding to a direct 
appeal, as defendant seems to argue. See Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640, 673 (1991) (even 
where the challenge may only be presented in state postconviction 
proceedings, there is no federal constitutional right to counsel 
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in the collateral proceedings). Postconviction proceedings, by 
definition, do not involve issues which could or should have been 
raised on direct appeal. Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547f 549 
(Utah 1989). Therefore, every issue properly raised in habeas 
proceedings will be raised for the first time, and the district 
court is in a position to entertain evidentiary hearings to take 
any additional evidence necessary to fully review the claims. 
Petitioner may raise his ineffectiveness claim for the first time 
in his habeas petition due to Utah's exception to its procedural 
bar rules. He does not explain why this entitles him to expanded 
constitutional rights. 
Finally, petitioner contends that his due process 
rights were violated because he was denied a thorough 
investigation into his ineffectiveness claims solely due to his 
indigency. The mere expense of an investigation is not a 
sufficient policy reason to require payment of costs and fees by 
the state as a constitutional right. Petitioner's claim that the 
proper investigation would require "large sums of money" and his 
assertion that the necessary evidence to support his claims 
exists are too speculative to establish a due process violation 
or to support an expansion of his constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of petitioner's 
habeas petition should be affirmed. 
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